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Abstract 
Magnitudes from different dimensions (e.g., space and time) interact with each other 
in perception, but how these interactions occur remains unclear. In four experiments, we 
investigated whether cross-dimensional interactions arise from memory interference. In 
Experiment 1, participants perceived a constant-length line which consisted of two line 
segments of complementary lengths and was presented for a variable stimulus duration; then 
they received a cue about which of the two segment lengths to later reproduce. Participants 
were to first reproduce the stimulus duration and then the cued length. Reproduced durations 
increased as a function of the cued length if the cue was given before duration was retrieved 
from memory for reproduction (i.e. before duration reproduction; Experiment 1) but not if it 
was given after the duration memory has been retrieved from memory (i.e. at the start of 
duration reproduction; Experiment 2). These findings demonstrate that space-time interaction 
arises as a result of memory interference when length and duration information co-exist in 
working memory. Experiment 3 further demonstrated memory interference on the memorised 
duration from cued filled lengths (i.e. solid line segments) but not from cued unfilled lengths 
(demarcated empty spatial intervals, which afford nosier memories than a cued filled lengths), 
thus highlighting the role of memory noise in space-time interaction. Experiment 4 further 
demonstrates that time can also exert memory interference on space when space is presented 
as noisy unfilled lengths. Taken together, these findings suggest that cross-dimensional 
interactions arise as a result of memory interference and the extent and direction of the 
interaction depend on the relative memory noises of the target and interfering dimensions. We 
propose a Bayesian model whereby the estimation of a magnitude is based on the integration 
of the noisily encoded percept of the target magnitude and the prior knowledge that 
magnitudes co-vary across dimensions (e.g., space and time). We discuss implications for 
cross-dimensional magnitude interactions in general.  
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1. Introduction 
We perceive things as varying in quantity or magnitude along different dimensions 
such as volume (how big), spatial extent (how long/large), duration (how much time), and 
numerosity (how many). More often than not, different dimensions of a stimulus (an event or 
object) co-vary in magnitude such that a stimulus with “more stuff” in one dimension also 
has “more stuff” in another (e.g., if a journey is longer in length, it normally also takes more 
time to travel). Indeed, research has shown that magnitudes of a stimulus’ concurrent 
dimensions are somewhat coupled in our perception: if one dimension decreases or increases 
in its physical magnitude, the perceived magnitude of a concurrent dimension is accordingly 
affected. A stimulus with a larger spatial extent (e.g., length or size), for instance, is perceived 
to have a longer temporal extent (duration) (Binetti et al., 2015; Cai, Connell, & Holler, 2013; 
Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008; DeLong, 1981; Xuan, Zhang, He, & Chen, 2007). Similarly, a 
duration is also perceived to be longer if it co-occurs with a larger-magnitude number or a 
larger numerosity of things (Cai & Wang, 2014; Chang, Tzeng, Hung Wu 2011; Dormal, 
Seron, & Pesenti, 2006; Oliveri et al., 2008; Xuan et al., 2007). These cross-dimensional 
magnitude interactions have been accounted for by assuming some commonality/association 
between different dimensions in their encoding (e.g., Walsh, 2003), their representations (e.g., 
Gallistel & Gelman, 2000), or their responses (e.g., Yates, Loetscher, & Nicholls, 2012). As 
we will see below, depending on their assumption of the cross-dimensional 
commonality/association, different accounts hold different views on the mechanics of cross-
dimensional interactions. 
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2. Mechanistic accounts of cross-dimensional magnitude interactions 
Most forms of magnitude perception and estimation involve three distinct stages: an 
encoding or accumulation stage where sensory information is registered and encoded into a 
mental magnitude (in a certain cognitive representational/neural format), a memory stage 
where the mental magnitude is maintained in and eventually retrieved from working memory, 
and a response stage where the retrieved mental magnitude is judged against some other 
magnitude (e.g., to make a reproduction or a comparison). For instance, in a duration 
reproduction task, subjective time accumulates as the stimulus duration unfolds; then the 
accumulated time is stored in working memory and later retrieved as the reference for 
deciding whether an ongoing reproduced duration is subjectively equal to a memorised 
duration so that reproduction can be terminated (for models of time reproduction, see Riemer, 
Trojan, Kleinböhl, & Hölzl, 2012; Wackermann & Ehm, 2006; Wearden, 2003). In the case 
where a stimulus has concurrent magnitudes in different dimensions to be perceived and later 
judged, the magnitudes are simultaneously encoded and then concurrently held in working 
memory, and often similarly judged (e.g., reproduced or compared to a reference magnitude). 
Thus, cross-dimensional magnitude interactions may arise in any of the three stages. Indeed, 
each of the three stages has been proposed as the locus of cross-dimensional interactions. 
 It has been proposed that different dimensional magnitudes are encoded using the 
same mechanism. An early example of such an account is Meck and Church (1983; see also 
Meck, Church, & Gibbon, 1985), who proposed that a common “counting” mechanism is 
responsible for encoding both duration and numerosity in animals (see Allman, Pelphrey, & 
Meck, 2012, for a recent review of this proposal). Walsh (2003) further proposed “a theory of 
magnitudes” (ATOM), arguing that all dimensional magnitudes are gauged using a common 
metric and represented as dimension-independent representation of quantities, or mental 
magnitudes (see also Bonn & Cantlon, 2017; Martin, Wiener, & van Wassenhove, 2017; 
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Lourenco & Longo, 2010; see Lourenco & Longo, 2011, for a review). Support for this 
account comes for both behavioural studies showing cross-dimensional interactions (e.g., 
Lambrechts, Walsh, van Wassenhove, 2013; Lourenco, Ayzenberg, & Lyu, 2016) and neural 
imaging studies showing overlapping activation in the intraparietal sulcus when different 
dimensional magnitudes are processed (see Bueti & Walsh, 2009, for a review). 
 An alternative conceptualisation is that magnitude information is encoded 
independently by dimension-specific processes but the encoded magnitudes can create 
interference across dimensions whilst being concurrently held in memory (e.g., Agrillo, 
Ranpura, & Butterworth, 2010; Cai & Connell, 2015, 2016; Cappelletti, Freemana, & 
Cipolotti, 2009; Dormal, Andres, Pesenti, 2008; Rammsayer & Verner, 2015). Memory 
interference is possible if one assumes that magnitudes across dimensions are stored as noisy 
memories of the same representational format (e.g., mental magnitudes; Gallistel & Gelman, 
1992, 2000; Whalen, Gallistel, & Gelmanet, 1999). Under this view, noisy mental magnitudes 
can be nudged by each other, thus resulting in cross-dimensional interference (Cai & Connell, 
2015, 2016). Of course, this account does not necessarily require a common representational 
format for different dimensional magnitudes; it is possible, for instance, that different 
dimensions may be structurally correlated (e.g., Lakens, 2012), thus allowing for cross-
dimensional interference. 
 Finally, it is also possible that cross-dimensional interactions arise at the response 
stage where the response for one dimension is biased by a potential response for another 
dimension (Moon, Fincham, Betts, & Anderson, 2015; Nicholls, Lew, Loetscher, & Yates, 
2011; Yates, Loetscher, & Nicholls, 2012). Yates and colleagues suggested that, when the 
same “more/less” categorical judgement is required for concurrent dimensions, a response for 
the target dimension can be primed by potential judgement for the irrelevant dimension (e.g., 
a line that is longer in length will prime a “longer” response toward the line’s duration). 
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Moon et al. (2015) assumed that spatial and temporal magnitudes of corresponding ranks cue 
each other (e.g., the second longest length cued the second longest duration) such that a 
response to a stimulus’ duration is influenced by the potential response to a competing 
duration cued by the length magnitude. It should be noted that, while these response-bias 
accounts are able to account for cross-dimensional interactions when the task involves 
categorical judgements, it is hard to see how they can account for space-time interaction in 
reproduction tasks (as in the experiments reported here), where no categorical responses are 
needed (Cai et al., 2013; Rammsayer & Verner, 2014). Indeed, Starr and Brannon (2016) 
showed that in duration and length reproductions, a concurrent verbal working memory that 
arguably severely limits people’s ability to verbally label length and duration stimuli as 
“short” or “long” does not impact the space-on-time effect.  
Whatever the locus of the interference, a successful mechanistic account of cross-
dimensional magnitude interaction needs to also accommodate the findings that magnitude 
dimensions vary in their susceptibility to interference from other dimensions: while some 
dimensions such as duration are mostly susceptible to cross-dimensional interference, other 
dimensions such as length and numerical magnitude seem to be more resistant to such 
interference (see Dormal & Pesenti, 2013, for a review, and Walsh, 2014, for some 
discussion). It has often been observed that, when perceiving concurrent numerosity and 
duration information (e.g., an array of dots presented for a certain duration), people’s duration 
perception is influenced by the concurrent numerosity information, but their numerosity 
perception is unaffected by concurrent duration information (Brown, 1997; Dormal et al., 
2006; Droit-Volet, Clement, & Fayol, 2003). The relationship between space and numerosity 
is less clear. While Dormal and Pesenti (2013) showed a stronger influence of numerosity on 
length than the other way round, Hurewitz, Gelman and Schnitzer (2006) showed that spatial 
size exerts a greater influence on numerosity than vice versa. In addition, though the 
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magnitude of numbers biases the perceived duration of a concurrent time interval (Cai & 
Wang, 2014; Chang et al., 2011), it is hard to imagine a scenario where a duration biases the 
perceived magnitude of a concurrent number. Perhaps more intriguing is the relationship 
between space (length in particular) and time. It been previously observed that space always 
exerts a greater influence on time than vice versa (Bottini & Casasanto, 2013; Casasanto & 
Boroditsky, 2008; Casasanto, Fotakopoulou, & Boroditsky, 2010; Magnani, Oliveri, & 
Frassinetti, 2014; Merritt, Casasanto, & Brannon, 2010). However, a more recent study by 
Cai and Connell (2015) suggests that space-time interaction is modulated by a variety of 
perceptual factors such as modality of perception and format of presentation, with time 
having greater interference on space than the other way around in certain cases (e.g., when 
length is perceived via touch; see also Wang & Cai, 2017). In this study, we use space-time 
interaction (the locus of which is currently being debated; see below) as a test case to explore 
the mechanics of cross-dimensional magnitude interactions; in particularly, we test the 
hypothesis that magnitudes of different dimensions interact with each other as a result of 
interference when magnitude representations of different dimensions are concurrently held in 
working memory. On the basis of the experimental results, we then propose a Bayesian 
inference model to characterise the occurrence of cross-dimensional memory interference. 
 
3. Magnitude interaction between space and time 
The dependencies in perception between the spatial extent (length) and the temporal 
extent (duration) of a stimulus have long attracted attention from psychologists. In early 
studies on space-time interdependencies (Cohen, Hansel, & Sylvester, 1953; Helson & King, 
1931), three stimuli are presented in sequence (e.g., three light points, A, B, C, one after 
another, on a wall) to define two spatial-temporal intervals (between points A and B and 
between points B and C). A spatial interval is perceived as longer if it is concurrently 
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accompanied with a longer temporal interval (the tau effect), and a temporal interval is 
perceived as longer if it is concurrently accompanied with a longer spatial interval (the kappa 
effect). Later research suggests these experiments lead people to impute uniform motion to 
the sequential stimuli, hence the interdependencies between space and time (Jones & Huang, 
1982). 
More recent research showed that length and duration information still interact with 
each other even when the task does not introduce imputed motion (Binetti et al., 2015; Cai et 
al., 2013; Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008; Magnani et al., 2014; Merritt et al., 2010; Starr & 
Brannon, 2016). Casasanto and Boroditsky (2008), for instance, presented a static line 
onscreen for a certain duration; after the disappearance of the line, participants reproduced 
either the duration (by making two mouse clicks so that the temporal interval between two 
clicks was the same as the stimulus duration) or the length (by clicking on an X and then 
somewhere to the right so that spatial interval between the two clicks as the same as the 
length of the line). They found that the reproduced durations increased as a function of the 
concurrent length. Cai et al. (2013) had participants watch a video in which a singer sang a 
note while making a non-sweeping gesture dissecting either a long or short spatial interval; 
they found that participants perceived the singing to last for longer if it was accompanied by a 
long than a short gesture. 
More striking is the observation of space-time asymmetry, which refers to the finding 
that, while length exerts an effect on duration, duration has no or a much weaker effect on 
length. Casasanto and Boroditsky (2008) found that participants were insensitive to the line’s 
duration when reproducing its length, though their duration reproduction was biased by 
concurrent length information. Such asymmetry in space-time interaction was replicated in 
subsequent studies when space was presented as filled lengths (e.g., presented as a solid line; 
Magnani et al., 2014; Starr & Brannon, 2016) and was also observed in children. Casasanto et 
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al. (2010) showed that, when asked which animal travelled for a longer length or for a longer 
time after watching movies of two animals travelling along parallel paths for different lengths 
or durations, both 4-5-year olds and 9-10-year olds were more susceptible to the irrelevant 
length information in their duration judgements than they were to the irrelevant duration 
information in their length judgements (see also Bottini & Casasanto, 2013, for a similar 
demonstration). Merritt et al. (2010) observed that adults did perceive a line to be longer if 
the line was presented for a longer duration, but such a time-on-space effect was argued to be 
smaller than the corresponding space-on-time effect. These findings of space-time asymmetry 
have been used to support the conceptual metaphor theory (Boroditsky, 2000; Casasanto & 
Boroditsky, 2008), which stipulates that people metaphorically employ concrete domains of 
knowledge to provide scaffolding for the understanding of abstract domains of knowledge 
(for instance, conceptualising the magnitude of a duration in spatial terms, e.g., a long/short 
time; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999); such an asymmetry in representational support (i.e. we use 
space to support our understanding of time more than vice versa) thus leads to the asymmetry 
in space-time interaction. 
More recent research, however, contradicts this account of space-time asymmetry. Cai 
and Connell (2015) showed that how length and duration interact depends on their relative 
memory acuity (or memory noise). They pointed out that previous studies showing space-
time asymmetry had used visually presented lines, which afford very detailed perception and 
memory. Indeed, they showed that when length is perceived with a less dominant sense such 
as touch (hence more memory noise; e.g., Manyam, 1986; Schultz & Petersik, 1994), 
concurrent length information fails to bias duration perception and length perception is 
instead influenced by the concurrent duration information. Wang and Cai (2017) further 
demonstrated that the format in which length is presented also affects how space and time 
interact. While less noisy filled length (in the form of a solid line, e. g., _________________) 
 11 
 
unilaterally affects duration (as in most previous studies), noisier unfilled length (a spatial 
interval demarcated by two boundaries, e.g., |                         |) and duration 
mutually interfere with each other. Indeed, they showed that the extent to which a dimension 
is influenced by a concurrent dimension is positively related to a participant’s level of 
memory noise for the target dimension. These studies thus demonstrate that space and time 
can have bilateral interference with each other and that space-time interaction is modulated 
by memory noise that is dependent on perceptual factors such as perception modality and 
presentation format. 
Little is known with respect to how space-time interaction (and indeed cross-
dimensional magnitude interactions in general) arises and how the interaction may be 
constrained by perceptual/memory factors. ATOM, as we discussed above, offers a 
representational account of why it is possible for space and time to interfere in perception (i.e. 
due to a common encoding system), but it is yet to provide a mechanistic account of how the 
interaction takes place (though the theory seems to favour an encoding account; see above). A 
similar lack of mechanistic characterisation also encumbers the conceptual metaphor theory.  
In an attempt to unravel the mechanism of space-time interaction, Cai and Connell 
(2016) examined whether length affects duration by biasing the actual accumulation of a 
duration, as visual flicker has been shown to do (Ortega & Lopez, 2008). In a duration 
reproduction task, visual flicker (a static vs flickering dot) or length (a short vs long line) was 
manipulated either during the encoding (i.e. accumulation) of the stimulus duration (i.e. 
participants saw a flickering/static dot or a long/short line presented for a duration and then 
reproduced the duration) or during the reproduction of a duration to match the stimulus 
duration (i.e. participants saw a neutral stimulus presented for a stimulus duration and then 
saw a flickering/static dot or long/short line while holding down a key to reproduce the 
duration). As found in Ortega and Lopez (2008), the flickering manipulation (flickering vs. 
 12 
 
static dot) produced reverse effects depending on the stage of its presentation: compared to a 
static dot, a flickering dot led to longer duration reproduction when presented during duration 
encoding but led to shorter duration reproduction when presented during duration 
reproduction. These results suggest that the flickering dot (relative to the static one) increased 
the actual accumulation of whichever duration it accompanied. In contrast, the length 
manipulation only produced an effect when presented concurrently with the stimulus duration 
but not with the reproduced duration (see Rammsayer & Verner, 2015, for a similar 
demonstration concerning spatial size and duration). These findings thus suggest that length 
information does not bias the actual accumulation/encoding of duration (otherwise length 
should have had an effect when accompanying the reproduced duration). 
Though disconfirming an encoding locus of the spatial effect on time perception, the 
findings in Cai and Connell (2016) are still steps away from showing that space-time 
interaction arises as a result of memory interference. Critically, their findings do not directly 
show that it is the memories of the encoded length and duration that interfere with each other. 
In addition, it is yet unclear how memory interference between space and time can account 
for the findings that space-time interaction is modulated by perceptual modality and length 
format (e.g., Cai & Connell, 2015; Wang & Cai, 2017).  
 
4. The current experiments 
In this paper, we address whether space-time interaction has its locus in memory by 
directly testing whether memories of length and duration bias each other and whether 
memory interference, if observed, is modulated by the memory noise associated with a 
magnitude dimension. To do this, we would need an experimental paradigm that would allow 
for keeping constant at the encoding stage the magnitude of the interfering dimension (e.g., 
length for a duration reproduction task) while varying in memory the interfering dimension’s 
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magnitude; observation of a cross-dimensional interaction as a result of magnitude memory 
manipulation would constitute evidence for memory interference among different 
dimensional magnitudes. To achieve this aim, in Experiment 1, participants perceived, for a 
variable duration, two line segments (in different colours) of complementary lengths (e.g., 
100 and 500 pixels, or 200 and 400 pixels) forming a constant-length combined line (see 
Figure 1). After the disappearance of the lengths, participants received a cue indicating which 
of the two lengths they were to later reproduce; this allowed for the cued length to be 
foregrounded in working memory and to influence the memory of the duration, as would be 
expected if space-time interaction results from memory interference. Then participants 
reproduced the stimulus duration and finally the cued length. Note that in this paradigm, the 
length dimension (the two segment lengths and also the combined length of the whole line) 
was kept constant in encoding; therefore, if duration reproduction is influenced by the 
magnitude of the cued length, such an effect cannot arise from encoding and should instead 
be attributed to memory interference. 
 
 
Figure 1. Trial structure for Experiment 1 (and other experiments followed a similar structure; 
see text for exceptions). Inset presents sample length stimuli (scaled for the figure) for 
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Experiments 1 and 2 (Inset A; filled lengths) and Experiment 3 (Inset B; filled and unfilled 
lengths). 
 
The rest of paper is organised as follows. First, we show that, in the above paradigm, 
reproduced durations increase as a function of the cued length if the to-be-reproduced length 
is cued before the perceived duration is retrieved from memory (i.e. when the to-be-
reproduced length is cued before duration reproduction; Experiment 1), but not if it is cued 
after the perceived duration has been retrieved from memory (i.e. when the to-be-reproduced 
length is cued after the start of duration reproduction; Experiment 2). These findings clearly 
suggest that length biases duration as a result of memory interference when they are 
concurrently held in memory. Experiment 3 demonstrates that the memory interference effect 
of space on time occurs when space is presented as less-noisy filled lengths (which afford 
detailed perception and memories) but not when space is presented as noisier unfilled lengths. 
Experiment 4 further demonstrates that time can also bias space in memory when space is 
presented as noisy unfilled length. Finally, we propose a Bayesian inference model to account 
for memory interference among magnitude dimensions and discuss implications for cross-
dimension magnitude interactions. 
 
5. Experiment 1 
In this first experiment, we investigated whether length biases duration as a result of 
memory interference. As shown in Figure 1, after seeing two complementary lengths (line 
segments) forming a constant-length line presented for a variable duration, participants were 
cued which length they were to later reproduce; then they first reproduced the stimulus 
duration and finally reproduced the cued length. If space biases time as a result of memory 
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interference, we should expect the duration memory to be biased by the memory of the cued 
length; hence reproduced durations should increase as a function of the cued length. 
 
5.1. Method 
5.1.1 Participants 
Twenty-two participants (2 replaced due to poor performance; see below) from South 
China Normal University took part in the experiment in return for a payment of 10 RBM 
(about $1.5). All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, with no reported colour blindness. 
5.1.2 Design and materials 
The experiment adopted a 5 (cued length: 100, 200, 300, 400 and 500 pixels) x 5 
(stimulus duration：900, 1200, 1500, 1800 and 2100 ms) design. We created 5 red line 
segments respectively 100, 200, 300, 400 and 500 pixels long and 5 blue line segments of the 
same lengths. We combined the red and blue segments in such a way that the overall length 
of the combined line was always 600 pixels long (e.g., 100 pixel red and 500 pixel blue; see 
Figure 1), resulting in 5 length combinations. Pairing the length combinations with the two 
left/right arrangements of the colours (red-blue vs blue-red) resulted in 10 lines. These lines 
were further paired with each of the 5 stimulus durations, resulting in 50 line-duration 
combinations. Each of these combinations had two versions where either the red or the blue 
segment was the cued length, thus resulting in a total of 100 trials. For example, in a trial, 
participants might see a 1200 ms presentation of a line consisting of a 100-pixel red segment 
on the left and a 500-pixel blue segment one the right, with the blue segment later being cued 
as the to-be-reproduced length.  
5.1.3 Procedure 
The experiment was run on E-Prime 1.0 on a 1024 x 768 computer screen. After 
giving their informed consent, participants were individually tested in a cubicle. They were 
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seated about 60 cm away from the computer screen. Before the main experiment, they 
underwent a practice session consisting of 8 trials. Each trial began with a line consisting of a 
red and a blue segment presented for a certain stimulus duration (see Figure 1), which was 
then replaced by a 300 ms blank screen with a red or blue border, the colour of which served 
as a cue informing participants about which of the two lengths they were to later reproduce 
(e.g., a red border informed participants that they were to later reproduce the length of the red 
segment). All subsequent events in the trial had the same coloured border until the length 
reproduction event (see Figure 1). After a blank screen of 300 ms, an asterisk appeared at the 
centre of the screen, after which participants could begin the reproduction of the stimulus 
duration by holding down the spacebar and terminate the reproduction by releasing the 
spacebar. The single asterisk, at the press of the spacebar, turned into three, which remained 
on screen until the spacebar was released. After the release of the spacebar, another blank 
screen (still with the same colour border) stayed on screen for 300 ms and was then replaced 
by a screen (without the colour border) with an “X” at a random position on the left hand side 
of the screen. Participants used the mouse to make a click right to the “X” such that the 
length interval between the centre of the “X” and the click position was the same as the cued 
length. The length reproduction task was followed by an inter-trial interval of 1000 ms. The 
experiment lasted for about 20 min. 
 
5.2. Results 
The coded data and analysis scripts for this and the following experiments are 
available at Open Science Framework: https://osf.io/zrg7d/. 
A reproduced duration was calculated as the time (in ms) from the press of the 
spacebar to its release. A reproduced length was calculated as the difference in the x-
coordinates (in pixels) between the centre of the X and the click point. We used the following 
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criteria to identify outlier reproductions and poorly-performing participants in this and all the 
following experiments: 1) a reproduction less than 1/3 or more than 3 times of the stimulus 
magnitude (e.g., reproductions of less than 400 ms or more than 2600 ms for a stimulus 
duration of 1200 ms) were considered as an outlier to be removed, and 2) a participant was 
judged as poor-performing and thus replaced if more than 1/3 of their reproductions in either 
duration or length were outliers. Two participants in this experiment were replaced. The 
outlier trimming for the remaining participants led to a removal of 5.3% of the duration 
reproductions and 1.5% of the length reproductions.  
For the remaining data, we averaged, for each participant, the reproduced durations or 
lengths for each combination of the cued length and the stimulus duration (e.g., 100 pixels 
with 900 ms) for linear mixed effects (LME) modelling. Following recent proposals (Bates et 
al., 2015; Matuschek et al., 2017), we determined the best fitting random effect structure 
using backward model comparison. We first built a model with stimulus duration and 
stimulus length (both z-transformed) as fixed effects and also with the maximal random effect 
structure, i.e. including corresponding random effects for all fixed effects (intercepts and 
slopes) and allowing all random effects to correlate. We next used backward model 
comparison to determine whether a random slope (and its correlations with other random 
effects) significantly contributed to the model fit and should thus be kept in the random effect 
structure; following Matuschek et al. (2017), we set the significance level at 0.2 rather than 
0.05 in order to avoid anti-conservativity.  
Figure 2 plots reproduced durations and lengths as a function of stimulus duration and 
cued length and Table 1 presents the LME results. Reproduced durations increased as a 
function of stimulus duration, suggesting participants’ duration reproductions were highly 
sensitive to the actual duration a line was presented for. Importantly, reproduced durations 
also increased as a function of cued length, suggesting that the memory of the perceived 
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duration was influenced by the memory of the cued length. Reproduced lengths increased as 
a function of cued length, but were not affected by the duration of the line. The latter finding 
that length perception was unaffected by concurrent temporal information is consistent with 
findings from previous studies using visually presented lines (e.g., Casasanto & Boroditsky, 
2008). 
 
Table 1: LME results for Experiment 1. Regression coefficients (β) and their SE are 
standardized; the intercept stands for the mean across all conditions. The LME model for 
reproduced durations included a maximal random effect structure and the LME model for 
reproduced lengths included a random effect structure with a random intercept and random 
slope of cued length. 
 Task dimension Predictor β SE t df p 
Reproduced 
duration 
Intercept 1109.5 53.6 20.69 21.0 < .001 
Stimulus duration 234.7 21.8 10.77 21.0 < .001 
Cued length 23.8 6.9 3.45 42.9 .001 
Reproduced 
length 
Intercept 271.9 6.6 41.18 21.0 < .001 
Stimulus duration -0.2 1.2 -0.13 505.0 .895 
Cued length 100.7 5.4 18.77 21.0 < .001 
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Figure 2. Results of Experiment 1: reproduced durations as a function of stimulus duration 
and cued length (upper panel) and reproduced lengths as a function of stimulus duration and 
cued length (bottom panel). Error bars, based on participant means, stand for standard errors. 
 
 
Figure 3. Ratio between reproduced and stimulus duration/length in all experiments. 
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Finally, we note that, for this experiment and indeed also the following experiments, 
both durations and lengths appeared to be under-reproduced as a whole; for instance, the 
intercepts in Table 1 were smaller than the average of the stimulus durations/lengths. Such 
under-reproductions probably reflect a response bias where people tend to arrive at a 
premature equivalence when estimating a being-reproduced duration (and indeed also other 
accumulating magnitudes; see Riemer et al., 2012). In addition, there is regression to the 
mean in both duration and length reproductions in this and also other experiments (see Figure 
3), that is, small magnitudes were relatively over-reproduced while large magnitudes were 
relatively under-reproduced (for reviews see Gu & Meck, 2011; van Rijn, 2016). Such a 
regression-to-the-mean bias has been argued to have resulted from Bayesian inference in 
magnitude estimation (e.g., Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; Petzschner, Glassauer, & Stephan 
2015), an issue we will return to in the general discussion. 
5.3. Discussion 
In this experiment, participants first saw two complementary lengths forming a 
constant-length line presented for a variable stimulus duration, were cued about which of the 
two lengths to later reproduce. They first reproduced the stimulus duration, and then 
reproduced the cued length. To do this, participants needed to first encode the duration and 
the two lengths and then hold them in memory. When a cue was given, they then accessed the 
memory of the cued length and foregrounded it in concurrence with the memory of the 
stimulus duration, making it possible for the two dimensional magnitudes to interfere with 
each other in memory. In this paradigm, the effect of the cued length could not have arisen 
from the duration encoding as the cued length had not yet been designated while the stimulus 
duration was being accumulated. The observation that the reproduced durations increased as a 
function of the cued length is the first direct evidence that space-time interaction occurs as a 
result of cross-dimensional memory interference. In Experiment 2, we tested whether the 
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interference still remains when the cue of the to-be-reproduced length is presented after the 
start of the duration reproduction (i.e. when the duration memory has been retrieved) such 
that there is no opportunity for the memory of the cued length to bias the memory of the 
duration. 
 
6. Experiment 2 
6.1. Method 
This was the same as in Experiment 1 except that the colour border (as a cue for the 
to-be-reproduced length) was presented after the start of the duration reproduction (see 
Figure 1). Another 20 participants from the same population as those in Experiment 1 took 
part and was rewarded with 10 RMB; none of them had taken part in Experiment 1. 
 
6.2. Results 
The same trimming method of Experiment 1 led to the exclusion of 2.3% of the 
reproduced durations and 2.2% of the reproduced lengths. Reproduced durations increased as 
a function of stimulus duration, but, unlike in Experiment 1, they were unaffected by cued 
length. Reproduced lengths increased as a function of cued length, and, as in Experiment 1, 
they were free from the interference of stimulus duration (see Table 2 and Figure 4).  
To further test whether there is a difference in the effect of cued length on duration 
reproductions between Experiment 1 and 2, we next conducted a between-experiment 
analysis, adding experiment (contrast-coded: Experiment 1 = 0.5, Experiment 2 = -0.5) and 
its interaction with cued length as additional fixed effects; the model included a maximal 
random effect structure. Reproduced durations increased as a function of stimulus duration (β 
= 235.7, SE = 14.7, t(41.0) = 16.05, p < .001) and cued length (β = 13.0, SE = 5.0, t(124.3) = 
2.58, p = .011), and were shorter in Experiment 1 than Experiment 2 (β = -182.3, SE = 72.4, 
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t(40.0) = -2.52, p = .016). More critically, the effect of cued length was moderated by 
experiment (β = 21.9, SE = 9.4, t(655.5) = 2.33, p = .020); such an interaction suggests that, 
in light of the results reported in Experiments 1 and 2, a cued length affected duration 
perception only when the cue was presented before the start of duration reproduction (i.e. 
while the perceived duration is still being kept in memory; Experiment 1) but not after the 
start of duration reproduction (i.e. after the duration memory has been retrieved for 
reproduction; Experiment 2).  
 
Table 2: LME results for Experiment 2. Regression coefficients (β) and their SE are 
standardized; the intercept stands for the mean across all conditions. The LME model for 
reproduced durations included a maximal random effect structure and the LME model for 
reproduced lengths included a random effect structure with a random intercept and slope of 
cued length. 
 Task dimension Predictor β SE t df p 
Reproduced 
duration 
Intercept 1296.5 79.9 16.22 19.0 < .001 
Stimulus duration 237.1 20.0 11.84 19.0 < .001 
Cued length 2.2 7.2 0.31 459.4 .760 
Reproduced 
length 
Intercept 257.5 8.1 31.61 19.0 < .001 
Stimulus duration 1.7 1.1 1.53 459.0 .128 
Cued length 96.3 4.8 20.0 19.0 < .001 
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Figure 4. Results of Experiment 2: reproduced durations as a function of stimulus duration 
and cued length (upper panel) and reproduced lengths as a function of stimulus duration and 
cued length (bottom panel). Error bars, based on participant means, stand for standard errors. 
 
6.3. Discussion 
Though reproduced durations increased as a function of the magnitude of a to-be-
reproduced length that was cued before duration reproduction (Experiment 1), such 
interference disappeared when the to-be-reproduced length was cued at the start of duration 
reproduction, as confirmed in both individual and cross-experiment analyses. The lack of a 
cued length effect in this experiment was not due to inattention to the cue presented at 
duration reproduction as participants needed to attend to the cue in order to later reproduce 
the cued length; in fact, the finding that reproduced lengths neatly increased as a function the 
cued length suggests that participants did pay close attention to the cue. Thus, the finding in 
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this experiment clearly rules out the possibilities that the cued length affects duration 
accumulation (otherwise a longer cued length would lead to a shorter reproduced duration) or 
it is implicitly labelled in a way that systematically biases duration reproduction decisions 
(see Cai & Connell, 2016, for a similar conclusion). The findings in this experiment and 
Experiment 1 thus suggest that space-time interaction arises as a result of memory 
interference: when the length cue was presented before duration reproduction, memory of the 
cued length was foregrounded in concurrence with memory of the stimulus duration, giving 
rise to cross-dimensional memory interference. However, when the cue was presented during 
duration reproduction, the memory of the stimulus duration had been retrieved for duration 
reproduction (e.g., Treisman, 1963; Gibbon et al., 1984; Wearden, 2003), hence not 
susceptible to the interference of the cued length. We will return to the mechanism underlying 
such cross-dimensional memory interference in the general discussion.  
 
7. Experiment 3 
The first two experiments showed that the space-on-time effect arises as a result of 
memory interference, but how can such an account accommodate findings that space-time 
interaction is modulated by the modality and format in which spatial length is perceived? As 
discussed earlier, when space is presented visually as filled length, it biases time but itself is 
not biased by time (e.g., Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008); in contrast, when space is haptically 
perceived, it is susceptible to interference from time (Cai & Connell, 2015). Wang and Cai 
(2017) also showed that space-time interaction also hinges on length format: while filled 
lengths (e.g., in the form of a solid line) unilaterally affects concurrent durations, unfilled 
lengths (e.g., demarcated empty spatial intervals) and concurrent durations have a reciprocal 
influence on each other. They further showed that these different patterns of interaction is due 
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to the fact that unfilled lengths afford noisier memory representations than filled lengths; 
hence, unfilled lengths are more susceptible to temporal interference than filled lengths.  
In this experiment, we tested whether the memory interference effect of space on time 
differs for filled and unfilled lengths. We first carried out a pre-test, where we assessed 
whether filled lengths are associated with less memory noise than unfilled lengths. To do this, 
we examined the coefficient of variation (CV for short, calculated as the ratio between the 
standard deviation and the mean of reproductions), which has been used to measure the 
memory noise of mental magnitudes (Cicchini et al., 2012; Droit-Volet, Clément, & Fayol, 
2008; Halberda, 2011; Schulze-Bonsel et al., 2006; Wearden, Denovan, Fakhri, & Haworth, 
1997): a larger CV signals more noise associated with a mental magnitude. We first used a 
pretest to assess whether filled and unfilled lengths differ in memory noise; then in the main 
experiment, we examined whether filled and unfilled lengths exerted differential effects on 
duration perception. If we show that lengths with a noisier memory affects duration to a 
lesser extent than lengths with a less noisy memory, then we can conclude that memory noise 
indeed modulates space-time interaction. 
 
7.1. Method 
The main experiment was the same as Experiment 1 except for the following. The red 
line segment in Experiment 1 was replaced with an unfilled length demarcated by two black 
vertical bars (see Figure 1, panel B in the inset). Participants were instructed to reproduce the 
filled length (i.e. length of the blue segment) if they had seen a blue border or the unfilled 
length (length of the demarcated empty interval) if they had seen a red border. The pre-test 
was similar to the main experiment except that the line (consisting of a filled and an unfilled 
length) was always presented for 1.5 seconds and participants only reproduced the cued 
length (i.e. no duration reproduction task). That is, participants saw a line (e.g., consisting of 
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a 100-pixel filled length and 500-pixel unfilled length) followed by a blue- or red-bordered 
screen (as the cue for the filled or unfilled length), and then they reproduced the cued length. 
The pre-test used 50 participants and the main experiment used 50 participants (6 
replaced for poor-performance) who did not take part in the pretest; we increased the the 
number of participants from Experiments 1 and 2 due to the increased complexity of the 
design and due to the fact that the critical effect was the interaction between cued length and 
length format. Participants were paid 10 RMB to take part. The pre-test lasted for about 15 
min and the main experiment for about 20 min. 
 
7.2. Results 
For the pre-test, we calculated the ratio (the reproduced length divided by the stimulus 
length) for each trial and removed any reproduction less than 1/3 or more than 3 times the 
stimulus length (about 1%). We then calculated the CVs for the two length types for each 
participant. A paired t-test showed that filled lengths resulted in a smaller CV than unfilled 
lengths (0.20 vs. 0.22, t(49) = -2.03, p = .048), suggesting that memories of the filled lengths 
were less noisy than those of unfilled lengths. 
For the main experiment, we excluded 3.5% of the reproduced durations and 1.2% of 
the reproduced lengths as a result of data trimming. In the LME model, apart from stimulus 
duration and cued length, the fixed effects also included length format (i.e. whether the cued 
length was filled or unfilled) and the interaction between length format and cued length; the 
latter critical interaction was to test whether length format modulates the effect of cued length 
on duration reproduction. Table 3 presents the LME results (see also Figure 5).  
Reproduced durations increased as a function of both stimulus duration and 
marginally so as a function of cued length; they were longer if the cued length was filled than 
unfilled. Critically, as indicated by the significant interaction between cued length and its 
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format, the space-on-time effect was larger for filled than unfilled cued lengths. To further 
explore this interaction, we conducted separate analyses for filled and unfilled cued length. 
When the cued length was filled, reproduced durations increased as a function of both 
stimulus duration (β = 236.9, SE = 14.2, t(49.0) = 16.65, p < .001) and cued length (β = 27.2, 
SE = 11.6, t(49.3) = 2.34, p = .023) (in an LME model with a maximal random effect 
structure). In contrast, when the cued length was unfilled, reproduced durations increased as a 
function of stimulus duration (β = 228.3, SE = 13.2, t(49.0) = 17.36, p < .001,) but not as a 
function of cued length (β = -5.8, SE = 6.7, t(49.2) = -0.87, p = .389) (in an LME model with 
a maximal random effect structure). These findings replicate the observation in Experiment 1 
that the memory of a filled length biased the memory of a perceived duration; more 
importantly, they show that the memory interference effect of space was modulated by length 
format (and indeed memory noise): it occurred for less noisy filled but not for noisier unfilled 
length. 
Reproduced lengths increased as a function of cued length and were longer with filled 
than unfilled cued length; they did not significantly change as a function of stimulus duration 
or the interaction between cued length and its format. Separate analyses showed that, 
reproductions of filled lengths increased as a function of cued length (β = 99.6, SE = 2.7, 
t(49.0) = 37.47, p < .001) but not as a function of stimulus duration (β = 0.7, SE = 1.0, 
t(1148.2) = 0.73, p = .469) (in an LME model with random a intercept and slope of cued 
length); reproductions of unfilled lengths increased as a function of cued length (β = 98.7, SE 
= 2.7, t(49.0) = 35.92, p < .001) and also marginally so as a function of stimulus duration (β = 
1.8, SE = 1.0, t(1149.1) = 1.85, p = .065) (in an LME model with a random intercept and 
slope of cued length).  
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Table 3: LME results for Experiment 3. Regression coefficients (β) and their SE are 
standardized; the intercept stands for the mean across all conditions. The LME model for 
reproduced durations included a maximal random effect structure and the LME model for 
reproduced lengths included a random effect structure with a random intercept and random 
slope of cued length and length format. 
Task dimension Predictor β SE t df p 
Reproduced 
duration 
Intercept 1220.3 37.9 32.20 49.0 < .001 
Stimulus duration 232.5 12.7 18.29 49.0 < .001 
Cued length 10.7 5.5 1.95 60.6 .056 
 Length format 16.8 5.9 2.85 49.2 .006 
 Cued length: 
Length format 
16.5 7.7 2.14 49.4 .037 
Reproduced 
length 
Intercept 269.6 4.5 59.79 49.0 < .001 
Stimulus duration 1.2 0.7 1.83 2347.2 .068 
Cued length 99.1 2.6 38.10 49.0 < .001 
 Length format 4.39 0.9 5.12 48.9 < .001 
 Cued length: 
Length format 
-0.5 0.7 -0.79 2347.2 .427 
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Figure 5. Results of Experiment 3: reproduced durations as a function of stimulus duration, 
cued length and length format (upper panel) and reproduced lengths as a function of stimulus 
duration, cued length and length format (bottom panel). Error bars, based on participant 
means, stand for standard errors. 
 
7.3. Discussion 
 The finding that reproduced lengths were longer for filled than unfilled cued lengths 
is consistent with previous research (Pressey & Moro, 1971). More importantly, results from 
CV showed that people filled lengths have higher acuity (i.e. less noise) than unfilled length 
(see Wang & Cai, 2017 for a similar finding). This difference in memory noise critically 
relates to the finding that filled and unfilled have differential effects on duration 
reproductions: the less noisy memory of the filled length biased the concurrent duration 
memory, replicating the finding in Experiment 1; however, noisier unfilled lengths failed to 
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affect duration reproductions. Such a finding is consistent with the conclusion of Cai and 
Connell (2015) that the interaction between space and time is shaped by the acuity with 
which space is perceived and memorized. Indeed, in another study (Wang & Cai, 2017), we 
provided additional evidence that the amount of interference a dimension is susceptible to is 
proportionally related with the memory noise that dimension has (a point we will return to in 
the general discussion). 
Also consistent with Cai and Connell (2015) is the observation that the (marginally 
significant) observation that duration was able to affect length when length was unfilled (i.e. 
with relatively a large level of memory noise). It should be noted that the marginal result 
might due to the large amount of noise in the length reproduction data as a result of the length 
reproduction task being a carried out after duration reproduction. In Experiment 4, we 
specifically tested whether duration information can exert memory interference on length 
when length is unfilled.  
  
8. Experiment 4 
Much research has failed to demonstrate any interference from time to space (e.g., 
Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008; Magnani et al., 2014; Starr & Brannon, 2016). Cai and 
Connell (2015) argued that this was because length in previous studies was perceived with 
high-acuity memories. Building on the finding in Experiment 3 that space-time interaction is 
modulated by memory noise, in this experiment, we tested whether time can also bias space 
in memory when space is presented as noisy unfilled lengths. To do this, we modified the 
paradigm in Experiment 1 (see Figure 5). An unfilled length demarcated by two vertical bars 
of a particular colour (e.g., blue) was presented for a variable stimulus duration and then the 
same unfilled length demarcated by two vertical bars of another colour (e.g., red) at the ends 
was presented at the same location for another stimulus duration. Participants were informed 
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beforehand that the two unfilled lengths were of the same length but they might be presented 
for different durations. After the disappearance of the second unfilled length, participants 
were cued which of the two durations to later reproduce after first reproducing the length. If 
duration memory can similarly interfere with length memory, we should expect reproduced 
lengths to increase as a function of cued duration.  
 
8.1. Method 
8.1.1. Participants 
42 participants (1 replaced due to poor performance) were all recruited from the same 
population as in the previous experiments (none of them had taken part in a previous 
experiment). We increased the number of participants from Experiment 1 and 2 as the effect 
of time on space, if any, tends to be smaller than that of space on time that we looked at in the 
previous experiments. They were paid 10 RMB for their participation. 
8.1.2. Design and materials 
The design was similar to that of Experiment 1. We used the usual 5 lengths (100, 200, 
300, 400, and 500 pixels) and the usual 5 durations (900, 1200, 1500, 1800, and 2010 ms). 
Since we presented two durations for each length, we created 5 duration pairs such that the 
combined duration within each pair was always 3000 ms (e.g., 900 and 2100 ms). Assigning 
each of the 5 lengths to the 5 duration pairs resulted in 25 length/duration combinations, 
which were further increased to 50 combinations by counterbalancing the order of the two 
coloured lengths (i.e. blue-bar length or red-bar length presented first). For each of these 50 
combinations, the cued duration (i.e. the duration to be reproduced) was either the first or 
second duration, resulting in a total of 100 trials in the experiment. 
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8.1.3. Procedure 
The procedure was similar to that in Experiment 1 (but see Figure 6). After giving 
their informed consent, participants underwent a practice session of 8 trials. A trial began 
with an unfilled length demarcated by two bars of a particular colour (e.g., blue) and 
presented for a duration, followed by the same unfilled length demarcated by two bars of a 
different colour (e.g., red) and presented for another duration. The second length presentation 
was then followed by a 300 ms blank screen with a colour border (blue or red) as a cue 
informing participants about which stimulus duration (duration of the blue-bar or red-bar 
length). The blank screen was followed by the length reproduction task that we used in the 
previous experiments: participants saw an “X” appearing at a random position on the left of 
the screen and clicked somewhere to the horizontal right of the “X” such that the length 
between the “X” and the click point would equal the stimulus length. The length reproduction 
task was followed by another blank screen of 300 ms with the same colour border as in the 
first blank screen. Then participants saw an asterisk and held down the spacebar to reproduce 
the cued duration (according to the colour border previously shown). There was a 1000 ms 
inter-trial interval. The whole experiment took about 25 min to complete.  
 
 
Figure 6. Trial structure for Experiment 4. 
 
8.2. Results 
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We excluded as outliers 0.2% of the reproduced lengths and 4.2% of the reproduced 
durations. LME modelling (Table 4) showed that reproduced lengths increased as a function 
of cued duration as well as of stimulus length (see Figure 7), suggesting an effect of duration 
memory on length memory. In other words, the time-on-space effect also arises as a result of 
memory interference, just as the space-on-time effect does. Reproduced durations increased 
as a function of both cued duration and stimulus length. The effect of stimulus length on 
duration is consistent with our previous findings of the memory interference effect of length 
on duration. 
 
Table 4: LME results for Experiment 4. Regression coefficients (β) and their SE are 
standardized; the intercept stands for the mean across all conditions. The LME model for 
reproduced durations included a maximal random effect structure and the LME model for 
reproduced lengths also included a maximal random effect structure though correlation 
between the random slopes and the random intercept were removed to achieve model 
convergence. 
Task dimension Predictor β SE t df p 
Reproduced 
length 
Intercept 274.6 4.2 65.48 41.0 < .001 
Stimulus length 102.9 3.3 30.53 41.0 < .001 
Cued duration 2.8 0.6 4.33 965.0 < .001 
Reproduced 
duration 
Intercept 1351.5 66.7 20.27 41.0 < .001 
Stimulus length 22.6 6.9 3.25 41.0 .002 
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Cued duration 156.3 14.7 10.65 41.0 < .001 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Results of Experiment 4: reproduced lengths as a function of stimulus length and 
cued duration (upper panel) and reproduced durations as a function of stimulus length and 
cued duration (bottom panel). Error bars, based on participant means, stand for standard 
errors. 
 
8.3. Discussion 
The finding that reproductions of unfilled lengths increased as a function of cued 
duration suggests that time can also bias the perception of space so long as the spatial 
memory is associated with a certain amount of noise (e.g., unfilled length). This finding is 
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consistent with an earlier finding that when space is perceived in a modality (e.g., haptics) 
that affords low-acuity representations, space is susceptible to temporal interference (Cai & 
Connell, 2015). More critically, as the to-be-reproduced duration was cued from memory 
after the durations and lengths had been encoded, the effect of the cued duration on length 
reproduction must have arisen as a result of cross-dimensional memory interference.  
 
9. General discussion 
In four experiments, we demonstrated that space-time interaction arises as a result of 
memory interference between the perceived length and the perceived duration. Such a 
conclusion is supported by the demonstrations that, after the encoding of length and duration, 
the magnitude in one dimension that is cued and hence foregrounded in memory biases the 
perceived magnitude in the other dimension. In Experiment 1, participants perceived two 
complementary lengths in a constant-length line presented for a stimulus duration. After 
being cued which of the two lengths to later reproduce, participants first reproduced the 
stimulus duration and then the cued length. Reproduced durations increased as a function of 
the cued length (a finding that was further replicated in Experiment 3). These findings 
suggest that space-time interaction has its locus in memory: the memory of the cued length 
biases the concurrent duration memory, hence the effect of the cued length on reproduced 
duration. In Experiment 2, however, the duration memory has been retrieved when the 
memory of the cued length is accessed (i.e. during duration reproduction), hence the lack of 
an effect of the cued length on duration reproduction. The conclusion that space-time 
interaction arises from cross-dimensional memory interference is further confirmed in 
Experiment 4: reproductions of unfilled lengths also increased as a function of cued duration, 
suggesting that the memory of a cued duration biases the concurrent memory of the target 
 36 
 
length. To our best knowledge, these findings are the first direct demonstrations that space-
time interaction arises as a result of cross-dimensional memory interference.  
The results in Experiment 2 helps to exclude the possibilities that cross-dimensional 
magnitude interactions arises as a response bias at the decisional stage. For instance, in 
Experiment 1, it is possible that the cued length was implicitly labelled as “long” or “short”, 
which then bias people to reproduce for longer or shorter (e.g., Yates et al., 2012; Moon et al., 
2015). If this were the case, we should expect people to also implicitly label the cued length 
when it was cued at the start of the duration reproduction (in Experiment 2), which would 
then in turn similarly bias reproduction responses. The fact that the cued length effect 
disappeared in Experiment 2 rules out the response bias account. In addition, it is worth 
discussing the possibility that the interference may additionally occur during the encoding 
stage (e.g., Bueti & Walsh, 2003; Walsh, 2003). According to this possibility, the 
complementary magnitudes of a particular dimension (lengths in Experiments 1-3 and 
durations in Experiment 4) biases the actual accumulation/encoding of the other dimension 
(duration in Experiments 1-3 and length in Experiment 4) but the effects cancel each other 
out. For instance, in Experiment 1, the longer length might have relatively increased the 
accumulation of the stimulus duration but the shorter length might have relatively decreased 
the accumulation. As the two lengths were complementary, their effects thus cancelled each 
other out without any apparent influence on the observed reproductions. While our 
experiments were not designed to test the encoding locus of space-time interactions, such an 
account has in fact been ruled out by previous findings. For instance, if a participant 
perceives a stimulus duration (e.g., in the form of a dot) and then perceives a line of different 
lengths while reproducing the duration, the length of the line does not bias the accumulation 
of the reproduced duration (Cai & Connell, 2016; Rammsayer & Verner, 2015). Indeed, the 
 37 
 
finding in Experiment 2 also suggests that the memory of the cued length does not bias the 
actual accumulation of the reproduced duration. 
Finally, Experiment 3 further showed that the memory interference effects between 
space and time are modulated by memory noise: less noisy memories of filled lengths, but not 
the noisier memories of unfilled lengths, were able to bias the concurrent memories of 
durations. The findings are thus in line with recent demonstrations that the interaction 
between space and time is modulated by perceptual factors such as perception modality and 
presentation format. Cai and Connell (2015) showed that noisier memories of haptically 
perceived lengths, but not less noisy memories of visuo-haptically perceived lengths, were 
biased by concurrent duration magnitude in perception. In particular, Wang and Cai (2017) 
specifically examined the role of memory noise in space-time interaction. They showed that 
the way space and time interact depends on the memory noise of the interfering dimensions. 
For instance, they showed that while time is able to affect space both when space is perceived 
as static unfilled lengths (i.e. an empty spatial interval simultaneously demarcated by two 
boundaries, as in Experiment 4) and when it is perceived as dynamic unfilled length (i.e. an 
empty spatial interval sequentially demarcated by two boundaries); in addition, the effect is 
larger for the noisier dynamic unfilled length than for the less noisy static unfilled lengths. 
More interestingly, they also showed that the space-on-time effect increases as a function of a 
participant’s memory noise in duration perception (as independently measured in a pretest of 
duration reproduction) and the time-on-space effect increases as a function of a participant’s 
memory noise in length perception (again as independently measured in a pretest of length 
reproduction). These findings thus echo the current findings to suggest that, if a dimension 
has higher memory noise, that dimension is more susceptible to cross-dimensional 
interference and is less able to influence magnitude memories in other dimensions. 
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Overall, the experimental findings provide the first set of direct evidence that cross-
dimensional magnitude interactions arise from memory interference. While previous studies 
have proposed similar hypotheses (Cai & Connell, 2015, 2016; Rammsayer & Verner, 2015), 
they provided neither direct empirical support nor specific mechanics with regard to how 
memory interference occurs. For example, Cai and Connell (2015) proposed that memories of 
magnitude, regardless of their dimensions, may bias each other; however, the mechanics 
underlying these observations is currently lacking. It is unclear, for instance, whether 
memories interfere with each other by attraction or repulsion and how memory noise 
modulates the degree of cross-dimensional interference. Next, we propose a Bayesian 
inference model of cross-dimensional magnitude interaction where we spell out the 
mechanics for cross-dimensional magnitude interactions. 
 
9.1. A Bayesian inference model of cross-dimensional magnitude memory interference 
Magnitude perception and estimation has been successfully modelled by assuming 
that these tasks are solved by means of Bayesian inference, in which a noisy perception is 
integrated with prior belief to arrive at a posterior belief about an object’s magnitude (e.g., 
Cheng, Shettleworth, Huttenlocher, & Rieser, 2007; Di Luca & Rhodes, 2016; Griffiths & 
Tenenbaum, 2011; Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Vevea, 2000; Li & Dudman, 2013; Jazayeri & 
Shadlen, 2010; Petzschner & Glasauer, 2011; Petzschner, Glasauer, & Stephen, 2015; see Shi 
et al, 2013, and Van Rijn, 2016, for reviews). Petzchner et al. (2015), for instance, showed 
that a Bayesian inference model with a prior matching the distribution of experimental 
stimuli accounts for a wide range of phenomena (e.g., the regression effect, the range effect, 
the scalar variability effect, and sequential effects) that are commonly observed in many 
magnitude dimensions (e.g., length, duration, angle). However, their model is unidimensional 
and cannot account for cross-dimensional magnitude interactions.  
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We next present a Bayesian inference model of concurrent magnitude estimation. In 
Bayesian inference, people form a posterior belief about the magnitude of one dimension of a 
stimulus (the estimated magnitude) by integrating a noisy memory of the perceived 
magnitude of the dimension with their prior belief about how likely each possible magnitude 
is for that dimension. Crucially, we assume that people expect different magnitude 
dimensions of a stimulus to co-vary in their “amount of stuff”. This belief of correlated 
concurrent magnitudes may have developed from learning about the world, where things 
larger in one magnitude dimension tend to also be larger in another (e.g., a longer length 
takes a longer time to travel; Acredolo, 1989; Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008; Piaget, 1969; 
Smith & Sera, 1992; Stavy & Tirosh, 2000). Thus, in our model, the prior distribution is a 
correlated multivariate distribution representing beliefs about the likely values of 
events/objects on all relevant magnitudes. Given the behavioural tendency for people to 
integrate sensory information across different aspects of a stimulus (e.g., McGurk & 
MacDonald, 1976; see also Trommershauser, Kording, & Landy, 2011) and the neural basis 
for such multisensory information integration (e.g., Meredith & Stein, 1986), we further 
assume that, while different magnitudes of different dimensions are separately encoded, the 
memories of these magnitudes are integrated due to the fact that they are concurrent 
dimensions of the same stimulus (e.g., the presentation of a line). Empirical evidence for such 
coupling of magnitudes across dimensions in our experience/knowledge comes from 
Srinivasan and Carey (2010). In their study, two groups of participants each learned 
positively correlated pairs of lengths and durations (a longer line was paired with a longer 
duration) or negatively correlated pairs (a longer line was paired with a shorter duration) and 
rated familiarity with learned pairs or novel pairs (e.g., negatively correlated pairs for 
participants initially learning positively correlated pairs). The positive correlation group were 
able to differentiate learned (positively correlated) length/duration pairs from novel 
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(negatively correlated), but the negative correlation group could not (i.e. they treated the 
unlearned positively correlated pairs and learned negatively pairs as similarly familiar). These 
findings strongly indicate that people have acquired, from their daily experience, knowledge 
of positive collinearity between length and durations that is strong enough to override 
knowledge from recent contradictory experience.  
Thus, when participants are to infer (e.g., reproduce or make a judgement about) the 
magnitude of a particular dimension, they inevitably recall the memory of the target 
dimension as well as that of the concurrent dimension. Integration of these memories is 
actually optimal as when the different dimensions co-vary in the environment and the 
memories of the dimensions are noisy, the retrieved magnitude of the concurrent dimension 
provides useful information about the magnitude of the target dimension. If the dimensions 
are positively correlated and the concurrent non-target magnitude is perceived to be relatively 
large, it is likely that the target dimension is also relatively large. Thus, people can increase 
their accuracy in estimating the magnitude of the target dimension by relying on their noisy 
memory of the magnitude of the target dimension and other, non-target dimensions. The 
resulting cross-dimensional interference effect is modulated by the relative noise of the 
memory of the target dimension compared to the non-target dimension. When the noise of the 
target dimension is low compared to the noise of non-target dimensions (as a result of 
decreased memory noise of the target dimension or a result of increased memory noise in 
non-target dimensions), the effect of non-target dimensions will be small. Intuitively, if the 
memory of the target dimension is already very reliable (i.e. there is little noise, as in the case 
of a number’s magnitude) then the memory of non-target dimensions is not needed when 
estimating the magnitude of the target dimension. When the noise of the target dimension is 
high compared to the noise of non-target dimensions, the effect of the latter dimensions will 
be relatively large. If the memory of the target dimension is unreliable then the memory trace 
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of non-target dimensions provides useful information to reduce the uncertainty about the 
magnitude of the target dimension.  
A formal description of the model can be found in the appendix. Here, we illustrate 
the main aspects of the model as shown in Figure 8. In particular, a comparison of the 
posterior distributions in panels B and D shows the concurrent magnitude effect of the 
vertical dimension (e.g., length) on the horizontal dimension (e.g., duration), where a 
relatively small length (panel B) results in a shorter estimated duration than a relatively large 
length (panel D).  
As shown in the appendix, cross-dimensional interference is modulated by memory 
noise. Firstly, between two concurrent dimensions, who influences whom in magnitude 
perception depends on their relative memory noise: the smaller the memory noise of the 
concurrent dimension compared to the memory noise of the target dimension, the larger the 
interference effect on the target dimension (see also Wang & Cai, 2017). This explains why, 
for instance, visually presented filled length has a robust influence on duration estimation but 
itself is less reliably influenced by concurrent duration (Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008; 
Merritt et al., 2010). Secondly, memory noise of a dimension also dictates the dimension’s 
ability to interfere with another dimension (less memory noise leads to better ability to 
interfere) and its susceptibility to interference from another dimension (less memory noise 
leads to higher susceptibility to interference; see also Cai & Connell, 2015, for the same 
conclusion). Indeed, our relatively simple Bayesian inference model accounts for all the main 
results observed in the current experiments. In Experiment 1, the length cue foregrounds the 
cued length in memory, together with the perceived duration. As illustrated in Figure 8A, to 
reproduce the duration, a posterior is computed from the correlated space-time priors and the 
noisy memories of the duration as well as the cued length, hence leading to an effect of the 
cued length on the reproduced duration (the same mechanism accounts for the effect of cued 
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duration on unfilled length reproduction in Experiment 4). The model also accounts for the 
lack of an effect of cued length on duration in Experiment 2. In this case, no length has been 
cued when a posterior is being computed to reproduce the duration. Hence, though both 
length memories may be accessed in duration memory retrieval, there will not be an effect of 
the length memories as the average of the two lengths is constant in Experiment 2. 
Experiment 3 showed that increasing the memory noise of length both reduces the effect of 
length on duration (and increases the effect of duration on length, according to Cai and 
Connell (2015)). This is consistent with the prediction of the model that the effect of the 
concurrent non-target dimensions on the estimation of the target dimension increases when 
the noise of the target dimension increases relative to the noise of the non-target dimensions. 
We have so far focused on concurrent magnitude estimation within a single trial. 
Inter-trial effects, such as the sequential effects discussed by Petzchner et al. (2015) can also 
be accounted for by allowing trial-by-trial shifts of the prior mean through a similar 
mechanism as proposed by Petzchner et al. We will leave such extensions to future work. 
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Figure 8. Illustration of the Bayesian inference model of concurrent magnitude estimation. (A) 
The prior distribution (shaded in main panel, where lighter areas reflect more probable 
magnitudes, and dotted lines in marginal plots) reflects a belief that the two dimensions are 
positively correlated. Red dot reflects an unbiased memory signal and broken lines in 
marginal plots reflect the likelihood, which shows that the horizontal dimension is noisier 
(more dispersed likelihood) than the vertical dimension. (B) Posterior distribution resulting 
from the prior and likelihood of panel A. There is regression to the prior mean for both 
dimensions, but this effect is larger for the horizontal (noisier) dimension than for the vertical 
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(less noisy) dimension. (C) Prior distribution as in Panel A, but the memory signal now 
reflects an object which is relatively large on both dimensions. (D) Posterior distribution 
resulting from the prior and likelihood of panel C. Again, there is regression to the prior mean 
on both dimensions, which is larger for the horizontal (noisier) dimension than for the 
vertical (less noisy) dimension. Importantly, the regression effect is overall weaker compared 
to panel B. Together, panel B and D reflect the effect of the magnitude of the vertical 
dimension on the estimation of the magnitude of the horizontal dimension. 
 
It may be argued that, as larger magnitudes are assumed to have a larger memory 
noise (Gallistel & Gelman, 1992, 2000), the model should predict the interference effect to 
increase as a function of the target magnitude. For instance, the effect of space should be 
greater when the stimulus duration is larger. While we agree with this model prediction, we 
take the caution that such a prediction may not be borne out in our space-time experiments. 
Firstly, it is likely that in our experiments the range of magnitudes might be too small to 
reliably detect this effect reliably. Secondly, a larger target dimension may require more 
cognitive resources for its encoding and memory maintenance; hence there are less resources 
that can be directed towards the encoding and memory maintenance of the concurrent 
magnitude, which then will increase its memory noise. For instance, a duration of 3s will 
require more cognitive effort to encode and memorise than a duration of 1s. Thus, the noise 
associated with the spatial magnitude increases and the spatial effect decreases in the case of 
the 3s duration, thus cancelling out the increased spatial effect due to larger memory noise 
associated with the 3s duration. Therefore, while it is true that, theoretically, the cross-
dimensional interference should be larger for larger target magnitudes, it is likely that we 
could not observe this effect reliably in our experiments due to the reasons mentioned above.  
 45 
 
The Bayesian account outlined here differs from previous conceptualisations of cross-
dimensional magnitude interactions. Our account does not require a common encoding 
mechanism (as ATOM does, e.g., Bueti & Walsh, 2009; Walsh, 2003) or a common memory 
representational format (e.g., Cai & Connell, 2015, 2016) for different magnitude dimensions. 
Contrary to the prediction of ATOM, recent research has begun to suggest that different 
magnitudes are encoded in a dimension-specific way, thus casting doubt on the proposal that 
there is a common processor for different magnitude dimensions (Agrillo et al., 2010; 
Rammsayer & Verner, 2016; Sobel, Puri, Faulkenberry, & Dague, 2016). Indeed, at least for 
space-time interactions, there is evidence suggesting that the interference does not arise at the 
stage of magnitude accumulation (Cai & Connell, 2016; Rammsayer & Verner, 2014) and in 
our Experiment 2, it was shown the memory of the cued length does not bias the 
accumulation of the reproduced duration. The memory account offered in Cai and Connell 
(2016) hypothesized a common representational format for length and duration in order to 
accommodate the cross-dimensional interference; there is, however, no explicit mechanism 
concerning how different dimensional magnitudes interfere with each other in memory. Apart 
from the assumption of a common representation format (which is not necessary in our 
current model), this account can indeed be subsumed in our Bayesian model, which provides 
a formal mechanism for the cross-dimensional magnitude interference. 
Our model assumes that the cross-dimensional interference arises from people’s daily 
experience and belief that different dimensions of the same thing tends to co-vary in 
quantities such that a stimulus that has “more stuff” in one dimension tends to also have 
“more stuff” in another (see also Srinivasan & Carey, 2010).1 Such cross-dimensional 
                                                          
1 It is possible that the experience of magnitude co-variation might have been genetically coded or 
neurally entrenched due to evolution (e.g., Walsh, 2003); note that such an account can explain, for 
 46 
 
association has also been exploited in a recent ACT-R-based computational model of space 
and time interactions proposed by Moon et al., (2015), who assumed that, in the course of an 
experiment, participants learn the ranks of magnitudes in each dimension and associate 
different dimensional magnitude of the same rank (e.g., the second longest length and the 
second longest duration). However, the two models differ radically in terms of the mechanics. 
As discussed, Moon et al.’s model places the locus of cross-dimensional interactions at the 
response stage. For instance, in their experiment, a line varied in its length or duration in 4 
magnitudes. Participants were slower at deciding which magnitude category (out of 4) the 
magnitude of a pre-specified dimension (e.g., length) belonged to when the concurrent length 
and duration differed in their ranks (e.g., 2nd longest length and 4th longest duration) than 
when they agreed (e.g., both 2nd longest). They argued that this was because the magnitude of 
the non-target dimension (e.g., duration) activates the magnitude of the same rank in the 
target dimension (e.g., length), thus two different response codes were retrieved when the 
length and duration were of different ranks, leading to slower responses. In contrast, our 
model predicts that the inferred magnitude for the target dimension should be shifted from the 
true magnitude to a greater extent when the two magnitudes are of different ranks than when 
they are of the same rank, hence the behavioural results. Thus, our model can account for 
their categorical judgement data, though it should be noted that it is unclear whether Moon et 
al.’s model can simulate reproduction data (as those in our experiments).  
 
9.2. Asymmetries in cross-dimensional magnitude interaction 
Not all dimensions are created equal in cross-dimensional magnitude interactions; 
some dimensions seem to “bully” others when different dimensions are concurrently 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
instance, that even neonates associate greater spatial lengths with longer durations, despite not having 
experience with space-time co-occurrences in the world (we thank a reviewer for this suggestion). 
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perceived. Many studies have demonstrated that numerosity information has an upper hand 
over duration information (Brown, 1997; Dormal et al., 2006; Droit-Volet et al., 2003); also, 
as we have extensively discussed earlier, visual spatial length tends to influence time more 
than the other way around (Bottini & Casasanto, 2013; Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008; 
Casasanto et al., 2010; Magnani et al., 2014; Merritt et al., 2010; Starr & Brannon, 2016), 
though in some cases it is possible to have time exert a greater influence length than vice 
versa (Cai & Connell, 2015).  
We have shown that, as least for space-time interaction, the direction and the extent of 
cross-dimensional interference is modulated by their relative memory noises (see also Cai & 
Connell, 2015; Wang & Cai, 2017). Between length and duration, length is often the more 
dominant force simply because length is often presented as visual filled length, which affords 
memories with relatively little noise. When space is presented in a way that leads to more 
memory noise (e.g., perceived haptically or as unfilled length), time exerts a greater effect on 
space and sometimes even unilaterally influences space (Cai & Connell, 2015); further 
evidence has shown that the extent to which a dimension (e.g., space or time is) susceptible to 
cross-dimensional interference varies as a function of the dimension’s memory noise (Wang 
& Cai, 2017). Thus, cross-dimensional asymmetries can be very well explained by our 
Bayesian inference model, assuming that magnitudes in different dimensions are maintained 
in memory with different levels of noise. That is, a noisier mental magnitude is less reliable 
and hence provides less information about the mental magnitudes of other dimensions, giving 
it less power to bias the estimation of those dimensions. A noisier mental magnitude is instead 
more susceptible to the interference from mental magnitudes of other dimensions as, 
according to experience, these dimensions can provide useful information about the noisy 
target mental magnitude. Under our model, spatial information in previous studies biases 
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numerosity information to a greater extent than vice versa because the spatial memories are 
less noisy than the numerosity memories.  
 We conceptualize memory noise as the discrepancy of mental representations of 
magnitudes from the true magnitude. This is the total noise accumulated during various 
cognitive stages such as encoding of a magnitude, storage, maintenance, and recall. The 
memory noise of a magnitude dimension is not constant; it varies according to the perception 
and presentation modes of a magnitude dimension (see Experiment 3; see also Cai & Connell, 
2015; Wang & Cai, 2017). Other factors may also change the level of memory noise of a 
magnitude dimension. Memory decay will result in an increasing level of memory noise. 
Thus, dimensions that afford repeated encoding and memory rehearsal will have reduced 
memory noise compared to dimensions that do not. For instance, if a length is presented for 3 
seconds, participants can repeatedly encode the length and rehearse their memory of the 
length during the presentation. However, the encoding of duration is a different matter: the 
encoding does not finish until the end of the 3 seconds and thus there is no repeated encoding; 
also, explicit memory rehearsal may not be practical as it would take 3 seconds to rehearse 
the memory. This would mean that duration suffers from greater memory decay (and from a 
greater degree of memory) than space in general. Of course, how memory decay affects 
cross-dimensional magnitude interaction is beyond the scope of this paper and still awaits 
investigation.  
As we briefly mentioned above, cognitive resources such as working memory and 
attention are additional constraints on memory noise associated with a magnitude. Working 
memory and attention are necessary for both encoding a magnitude stimulus and maintaining 
it in memory. For instance, Starr and Brannon (2016) showed that, while the effect of space 
on time occurs under a verbal working memory load or no working memory load, it 
disappeared under spatial working memory load. Under our proposed Bayesian model, while 
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the memory noise of (filled) lengths tends to be smaller than that of durations (e.g., Droit-
Volet et al., 2008), a concurrent spatial (but not verbal) working memory load will increase 
the length’s noise, hence reducing or even eliminating the space effect on time.  
 Processing automaticity may also affect the level of memory noise. It has been 
suggested that magnitude dimensions may differ the degree of automaticity during encoding 
(Dormal & Pesenti, 2013; Moon et al., 2015). Dormal and Pesenti (2013) observed that 
numerosity is less susceptible to cross-dimensional interference from length and duration 
while duration is most susceptible and argued that the patterns of interaction was due to 
numerosity enjoying a higher level of automaticity than length, which is in turn accessed 
more automatically than duration. Moon et al. (2015) also suggested that the processing of 
length is more automatic and efficient than the processing of duration, hence the asymmetry 
in interference between the two. A phenomenon related to processing automaticity is 
subitizing, a rapid process of encoding with little noise in the resultant mental magnitude 
when the input magnitude is small (e.g., an array of 4 dots; Dehaene & Cohen, 1994). We 
suspect that subitizable magnitudes may have little memory noise and will hence be strongly 
resistant to cross-dimensional magnitude interference. TIME AS EVOLVING OVER TIME, 
HENCE MORE NOISY? 
 
9.3. Is space special for the mental representation of time? 
 The conceptual metaphor account concerning temporal knowledge and perception 
argues that people use spatial experience to support our understanding of time (Boroditsky, 
2000; Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008; Clark, 1973; Gibbs, 2006; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 
1999). Two observations have been cited in support of such a proposition. Firstly, in many 
languages, time is often expressed in spatial terms (e.g., two days before Christmas; two 
minutes long). Many have argued that these “linguistic loans” from space to time reflect a 
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deeper conceptual dependency of time on space and indeed quite a few studies have shown 
that our understanding of time does vary according to our spatial experience (Boroditsky, 
2000; Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002; de la Fuente, Santiago, Román, Dumitrache, & 
Casasanto, 2014).  
Another line of evidence for the conceptual metaphor account is the space-time asymmetry: 
that is, because durations co-opt spatial terms for mental representation but not the other way 
round, the space-on-time effect should be always greater than the time-on-space effect 
(Bottini & Casasanto, 2013; Casasato & Boroditsky, 2008; Casasanto et al., 2010; Merritt et 
al., 2010). However, recent experimental findings, as we have discussed, have contradicted 
such a space-time asymmetry prediction. In particular, there has been much evidence 
showing that time can bias space to a similar or even larger extent than space does time under 
certain circumstances (i.e. when space is perceived with a high level of memory noise; Cai & 
Connell, 2015; Wang & Cai, 2017). In fact, earlier studies on the tau effect (a time-on-space 
effect) and the kappa effect (a space-on-time effect) have shown that when length is 
presented as unfilled, it is as susceptible to temporal interference as time is to spatial 
interference (see Jones & Huang, 1982, for a review). The tau effect, together with the 
demonstrations that the space-time asymmetry can be neutralised or even reversed (Cai & 
Connell, 2015; Experiment 4), suggests that the space-time asymmetry does not reflect that 
time co-opts space for mental representation. 
One can argue that space-time asymmetry may also reflect, apart from conceptual 
metaphorical re-use, relative accessibility of the physical dimensions (e.g., Bottini & 
Casasanto, 2013). For instance, it is possible that haptic or unfilled lengths were less 
accessible compared to visual or filled lengths, hence reducing their interference with 
temporal processing and making these lengths more prone to temporal interference. While 
this modification of the conceptual metaphor account may allow it to accommodate the data, 
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we believe that our Bayesian inference model offers a more straightforward account. 
That is, space-time asymmetry does not reflect temporal dependency on space in mental 
representation; instead, the asymmetry is caused by the fact that space affords less noisy 
memories when it is visually presented as filled length (as in many previous studies). Hence, 
visually presented filled length is not only strong in its cross-dimensional influence but also 
very robust in resisting interference from other dimensions. When space is perceived 
haptically or as unfilled length, its cross-dimensional interference decreases or even vanishes 
and it is more susceptible to temporal interference. 
 
9.4. Cognitive penetration in perception 
 Many studies in the past decades have investigated how low-level perception (e.g., 
vision) can be susceptible to influences from higher-level cognitive domains such as 
motivation, emotion and categorization. Perception of spatial lengths, for instance, is shown 
to be subject to one’s motivation and effort, with people judging a destination to be closer if 
they find the destination more desirable (Alter & Balcetis, 2011), a target to be farther away if 
they have thrown a heavier than a lighter ball (Witt, Proffitt, & Epstein, 2004), colours to be  
darker if they are in a negative emotional state (Meier, Robinson, Crawford, & Ahlvers, 2007) 
and the colour appearance of an object to be tinted with that object’s typical colour (e.g., 
yellow for bananas; Hansen et al., 2006). Indeed, as we briefly discussed earlier, such 
cognitive penetration has been argued to underlie some cross-dimensional magnitude 
interaction observations (Nicholls, et al., 2011; Yates et al., 2012). More recently, it was 
suggested that, instead of infiltrating percept encoding, cognitive factors may at most bias 
post-encoding memory inference when a judgement is made on the basis of a veridical 
percept encoded independently of higher-level cognitive influences (Firestone & Scholl, 2015, 
2016); for instance, people might be more likely to conclude that the target must be far away 
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after experiencing having difficulty in reaching the target with their throws. The conclusion 
by Firestone and Scholl that cognitive interference arises in memory rather than encoding is 
consistent with our current findings and our Bayesian account. Indeed, it may be interesting 
to consider some of the cognitive effects on perception in light of magnitude memory 
interference. It is possible that magnitude in weight (e.g., weight of a ball) might exert some 
interference on the magnitude of distance when people estimate the distance of a target after 
throwing a ball. If this is the case, it may be interesting to see whether the size of these 
cognitive effects might reflect the relative acuity or noisiness of the precepts of the target and 
non-target domains (e.g., target distasnce and ball weight).  
 
10. Summary 
  We presented the first set of direct evidence that cross-dimensional magnitude 
interactions arise from memory interference; in addition, these interactions are constrained by 
the memory noise associated with the dimensions such that a magnitude with more noise is 
less able to interfere with other magnitudes in memory and is instead more susceptible to 
interference from others. Cross-dimensional magnitude interference in memory, we argued, 
arises from Bayesian inference where people combine their prior experience of correlated 
magnitudes across dimensions and the noisy memory of the target magnitude. 
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